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Abstract
This paper presents empirical support for the existence non-linear eﬀects in the contri-
bution of ﬁnancial intermediation to economic growth, and oﬀers a theoretical explanation
for these eﬀects. We show that the exogenous contribution of ﬁnancial development to eco-
nomic growth has diﬀerent eﬀects for diﬀerent levels of income per capita. We ﬁnd that this
contribution is generally increasing with the level of income per capita of the economy, up to
a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries,
and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a growth model
of ﬁnancial intermediation to account for these wealth eﬀects. We show that at early stages
of economic development, a bank can increase the welfare of its depositors only at the cost
of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed a certain wealth
threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. However,
for high levels of wealth, growth generated by ﬁnancial intermediation declines as the eco-
nomy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.
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king crises.
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Resumen
Este art´ ıculo presenta evidencia emp´ ırica sobre la existencia de efectos no lineales en la
contribuci´ on del desarrollo ﬁnanciero sobre el crecimiento econ´ omico y ofrece una explicaci´ on
te´ orica sobre estos efectos. La contribuci´ on es generalmente creciente con el nivel de ingreso
per capita de la econom´ ıa, hasta un nivel relativamente alto de ingreso. Sin embargo, esta
contribuci´ on es consistentemente menor para pa´ ıses pobres, e incluso puede ser negativa. Se
propone un modelo de crecimiento con intermediarios ﬁnancieros para explicar estos efectos.
En las etapas tempranas de desarrollo econ´ omico, el sistema bancario puede incrementar el
bienestar de sus depositantes a costa de reducir la inversi´ on y el crecimiento. Sin embargo,
existe un umbral de riqueza a partir del cual las funciones de liquidez del sistema bancario
se vuelven inequ´ ıvocamente positivas para el crecimiento. Finalmente, para niveles altos de
riqueza, la contribuci´ on al crecimiento de la intermediaci´ on ﬁnanciera se reduce conforme la
econom´ ıa tiende hacia el nivel m´ aximo de riesgo compartido.
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In recent years the relationship between ﬁnancial development and economic growth has re-
ceived close attention in the literature. A large number of empirical studies supports the
existence of a positive relationship between ﬁnancial intermediation and growth.1 King and
Levine (1993 a,b), show that ﬁnancial development is a good predictor of future growth. More
recently, Levine, et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000) use an external instrumental variables
estimation, and a GMM dynamic panel data estimation to overcome potential problems of
endogeneity of ﬁnancial development, and conﬁrm the existence of a strong, positive contri-
bution of the exogenous component of ﬁnancial development to economic growth. However,
most of these studies assume a uniform ﬁnancial intermediation-growth relationship and, al-
though panel data estimations, such as Levine et al. (2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (2000),
etc., control for unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects, there can be country-group characteristics
that generate an asymmetric eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth. De Gregorio and
Guidotti (1995), for example, show that in a panel regression for Latin American countries
ﬁnancial intermediation is negatively linked with economic growth, and suggest that this re-
sult may reﬂect the negative eﬀect of the ﬁnancial crises experienced by several countries in
the region.
The data on ﬁnancial development provides initial evidence that the growth beneﬁts of
ﬁnancial intermediation diﬀer with the level of wealth of the economy.2 Table 1 summarizes
data on ﬁnancial development and growth; it orders countries by quartiles according to their
real per capita GDP growth over the period 1970-2000. For each group, it displays the percent
variation of ﬁnancial depth, as measured by the annual percent growth rates of private credit
and liquid liabilities, respectively, as well as the mean of initial and ﬁnal income. Table
1 suggests a positive relationship between growth performance and ﬁnancial development.
Moreover, those countries that grew faster had a joint high performance of growth and ﬁnancial
development, and are typically middle-income economies which have "emerged" during the
period. At the other end, in the ﬁrst quartile, we ﬁnd countries that have experienced declines
in per capita income during the period along with poor ﬁnancial development. This suggest
that ﬁnancial intermediation plays a crucial role in the growth performance of middle-income,
emerging economies, and the possibility of wealth eﬀects on this relationship.
1See for example Levine and Zervos (1996) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2000). Levine (1997) provides a good
summary of the ﬁnancial development-growth literature.
2This diﬀerential eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth depending on the level of GDP per capita
(used here as a proxy for wealth) is what we term the "wealth eﬀect." It should be distinguished from the
"wealth eﬀect" arising from price changes that aﬀect endowments and, thus, demand for a given good, a topic
pertaining consumer demand.
1Table 1: Financial Development and Real Per Capita Growth (1970-2000)
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.
Q1 -0.90 0.15 0.60 1215.8 1042.3
Q2 1.16 1.04 1.63 4585.2 6544.1
Q3 2.07 1.90 1.20 8987.3 16444.1
Q4 3.33 3.28 2.24 6221.5 15090.3
Average 1.41 1.59 1.42 5252.4 9780.2
Number of Countries 72
1
 Real GDP per capita, constant US$. Source: World Development Indicators WB
2
 Source: International Financial Statistics IMF
Growth Quartile        
.
In this paper we test for the existence of wealth eﬀects in the contribution of ﬁnancial
intermediaries development to economic growth. It is important that the study of wealth
eﬀects on this relationship separates the eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation from other country
and country-group characteristics that may have an asymmetric eﬀect on growth for diﬀerent
income groups. We thus include country-speciﬁce ﬀects and a set of control variables that
can mitigate this problem. However, it is diﬃcult to separate the growth-promoting eﬀects of
ﬁnancial intermediation from the increase in ﬁnancial vulnerability that ﬁnancial development
brings about, because ﬁnancial crises can generate large and persistent output losses. Domes-
t i cc r e d i to fﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector is one of the most common proxies
for ﬁnancial intermediation development in the growth literature, but its rate of growth is also
among the best predictors for banking crises (see for example Demirguc-Kunt and Degatri-
ache, 1998 and 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Using a pooled mean group estimator,
Loayza and Ranciere (2002) show that a long-run positive relationship between ﬁnancial in-
termediation and growth can coexist with a negative short-run relationship due to ﬁnancial
crises.3
We use a GMM dynamic panel data system estimator, as in Levine et al. (2000), for
a sample of 83 countries for the period 1960-2000. This estimation technique addresses the
issue of joint endogeneity of ﬁnancial development and the other explanatory variables, by
using "internal" instruments (lagged values of the explanatory variables). After controlling
for the episodes and duration of ﬁnancial crises, we analyze how the level of income per capita
modiﬁes the estimated eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth performance. We use two
standard measures to proxy ﬁnancial intermediaries development: the ratio of liquid liabilities
to GDP, and the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP. For both indicators the
results of the estimations show the existence of wealth eﬀects, and suggest that in economies
with low levels of per capita income, ﬁnancial development has a consistently smaller growth
3Gaytan and Ranciere (2005) provide a theoretical model to integrate the short-run analysis of ﬁnancial
crises and the long-run positive contribution of ﬁnancial intermediation to economic growth.
2eﬀect, and that this eﬀect may even be negative for suﬃciently low levels of wealth. For higher
per capita income levels there is a positive and increasing contribution and after reaching a
maximum, it starts to decrease.4
On the theoretical side, it has been recognized that ﬁnancial intermediaries play several
roles that can foster economic growth. Among these roles, ﬁnancial intermediaries: (i) provide
an eﬃcient mechanism that channels savings to those investments with the highest rates of
returns; (ii) are eﬃcient suppliers of liquidity (i.e., can transform illiquid assets into liquid
liabilities); (iii) provide liquidity insurance that reduces idiosyncratic liquidity risk; (iv) allow
an eﬃcient pooling of risk among diﬀerent investment projects; (v) ameliorate information
asymmetries (i.e., are eﬃcient institutions for screening and monitoring investment projects).5
The model developed in this paper focuses only on the relationship between the ﬁrst three
roles stated above and economic growth.
We use an intertemporal model of ﬁnancial intermediaries to analyze the dynamics of
wealth, capital and consumption. The model embeds a modiﬁed version of the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) model of liquidity provision (DD henceforth) into an overlapping generations
framework.6 There are two technologies available: a storage technology, and a long-term
technology. The long-term technology is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function
with capital and labor as inputs. This technology constitutes the channel of investment and
growth over time and among generations.
As a benchmark of zero ﬁnancial development, we study ﬁnancial autarky, where agents
have no access to credit markets. This benchmark is useful to study the eﬀect on output,
consumption and welfare of introducing ﬁnancial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries
provide liquidity insurance to maximize the welfare of the current generation of depositors.
However, this insurance may introduce costs in terms of economic growth. For low levels
of wealth, the provision of liquidity insurance may force an early liquidation of long-term
4Odedokun (1996) ﬁnds that the positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on growth is higher for low income
than for high income LDCs, an opposite result than the one presented here. However, this author estimates
time series equations , one per each country using OLS-GLS with potential biases due to the endogeneity
of explanatory variables (including factor accumulations rates), and it does not take into account potential
country speciﬁce ﬀects, and the higher recurrence of ﬁnancial crises episodes in high income LDCs.
5See for example Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint Paul (1992), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
Levine (1997) presents an excelent review of the growth-promoting eﬀects of ﬁnancial intermediation found in
the literature.
6In this paper we are interested in the long-run eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth. Consequently,
the theoretical model abstracts from ﬁnancial crises, and in the empirical estimation we control for the eﬀect
of banking crises. In Gaytan and Ranciere (2005) we present a model that includes the possibility of bank
run equilibria and show what are the growth and welfare consequences of having ﬁnancial crises with positive
probability.
3projects that, although eﬃcient in terms of the welfare of the current generation, may reduce
the rate of capital accumulation. Nevertheless, once the economy has crossed certain threshold
of economic development, this trade-oﬀ disappears and ﬁnancial intermediaries can provide
liquidity insurance and attain higher levels of growth and output. In this case, the role of
banks as liquidity providers is always growth enhancing. However, above some high level
of wealth, once the economy has exhausted the consumption risk sharing possibilities, the
growth-enhancing eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation declines.
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Ennis and Keister (2003), Qi (1994) and Fulghieri and
Rovelli (1998) have studied the DD model in overlapping generations frameworks. Qi (1994)
and Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998) focus on intergenerational transfers and not on growth; their
models have technologies with constant returns to capital and are endowment economies with-
out capital accumulation or any wealth dynamics. Ennis and Keister (2003) and Bencivenga
and Smith (1991) are closer to our paper, since they investigate the relationship between
ﬁnancial intermediation and growth. However, their models are endogenous growth models
with constant returns to capital; under this assumption, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation
is no longer wealth dependent. In our model, the use of a Cobb-Douglas technology for the
long asset makes the returns to investment endogenous, the banking solution (the banking in-
vestment portfolio, liquidation policy and deposit contract) becomes dependent on the level of
wealth of the economy, and introduces the possibility of a trade-oﬀ between short-run liquidity
and economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, methodology
and the estimation results of wealth eﬀects in the ﬁnancial intermediation-growth relationship.
Section 3 presents the general set up of the model: the structure of overlapping generations,
preferences and the technologies available. Section 4 presents the portfolio choice and the
growth implications of ﬁnancial autarky. Section 5 presents the optimal risk sharing solution
of ﬁnancial intermediation and its consequences for economic growth. Section 6 analyzes the
consequences of ﬁnancial intermediation in terms of welfare and growth. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2W e a l t h E ﬀects in the Financial Intermediation-Growth Re-
lationship
In this section we study how the exogenous component of ﬁnancial intermediation aﬀects eco-
nomic growth for diﬀerent levels of income per capita. For this purpose we use the method-
ology of GMM dynamic panel data system estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991),
4Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).7 This methodology addresses the
issues of joint endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, and of po-
tential biases induced by country-speciﬁce ﬀects. First, we describe the methodology and data
used in the estimation, and then we show that the estimation results support the existence of
wealth eﬀects in the contribution of ﬁnancial development to economic growth.
2.1 Data and Methodology
The data set consists of a panel of observations for 83 countries for the period 1960-2000. To
smooth the series from business cycle ﬂuctuations and concentrate on long run-growth eﬀects
of ﬁnancial intermediation, we use low frequency data by averaging, for each country the
information on growth and the explanatory variables in at most 8 non-overlapping ﬁve-year
periods. The resulting panel of country and time-period observations is unbalanced. Table 2
in Appendix B presents the lists of countries included in the sample.
The dependent variable is average income per capita growth. We use two indicators of
ﬁnancial development: liquid liabilities as a proportion of GDP, and the ratio of domestic
credit to the private sector to GDP. Liquid liabilities is a standard measure of ﬁnancial depth,
which measures the size of the ﬁnancial sector. Private credit goes beyond a size eﬀect of
ﬁnancial intermediation, since it provides more information on the level of ﬁnancial services
and the growth-promoting activities of ﬁnancial intermediaries. In addition to the ﬁnancial
development variables, the regressions include a set of control variables. As is standard in the
growth literature, initial income per capita is included to capture either the distance from the
steady state, for a Solow-type growth model, or the catching up eﬀect of new technologies, for
an endogenous growth model. To control for human capital we use average years of secondary
schooling. Inﬂation and the size of the government (government expenditure as proportion of
GDP) enter the regression to control for the extent of macroeconomic in stability. Finally, the
degree of trade openness (exports plus imports as proportion of GDP) is presumed to have a
positive impact on growth. Table 3 in Appendix B presents the deﬁnitions and sources of the
v a r i a b l e su s e di nt h ee s t i m a t i o n .
We are interested in estimating the following equation:
yi,t − yi,t−1 =( α − 1)yi,t−1 + β0CVi,t + γFDi,t + µt + ηi + εi,t, (1)
where y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, CV is the set of control variables other than
initial income, FD is the ﬁnancial development measure, µt is the time-speciﬁce ﬀect, ηi is
the country-speciﬁce ﬀect, and εi,t is the error term.
7Applications of this methodology to the growth-ﬁnancial development relationship are: Levine et. al.
(2000) and Beck et. al. (2000).
5As a ﬁrst approximation, we test for the existence of wealth eﬀects in the relationship
between ﬁnancial intermediation and growth by introducing slope dummies for ﬁnancial de-
velopment variables for diﬀerent income groups. We substitute the ﬁnancial intermediation
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i,t is a slope dummy that takes the value
of FDi,t if country i belongs to the income group j, and zero otherwise. We use two diﬀerent
classiﬁcations; the ﬁrst set of income groups is deﬁn e db yt h ec l a s s i ﬁcation of the World Bank
for low, middle-low, middle-high, and high-income OECD countries. The income groups using
this classiﬁcation are J = {γL,γML,γMH,γOECD}.8 However, the World Bank classiﬁcation
does not necessarily provides the appropriate thresholds for wealth eﬀects on the ﬁnance-
growth relationship. Thus, we also use a more ﬂexible classiﬁcation. We deﬁne income groups
using deciles for average initial income per capita for the country data used in the estimation,
and the income groups are J = {γ1,...,γ10}. Table 2 in Appendix B presents the list of
countries and their respective classiﬁcations.9
Another way to capture the existence of wealth eﬀects on the relationship is through
the use of a non-linear speciﬁcation in which the initial level of income per capita interacts
with ﬁnancial development. As we will see, the estimation results for the decile classiﬁcation
suggest that the contribution of ﬁnancial development to growth, γ, can be approximated by
the following linear quadratic speciﬁcation: γ = δ0 +δ1yi,t−1 +δ2y2
i,t−1. Thus, equation 1 can
be rewritten as:
yi,t−yi,t−1 =( α − 1)yi,t−1+β0CVi,t+δ0FDi,t+δ1FDi,tyi,t−1+δ2FD i,ty2
i,t−1+µt+ηi+εi,t. (2)
This speciﬁcation has the advantage that it does not rely on ﬁxed groups of countries, and
ideally it would allow us to identify: (i) whether there is, within the sample, a low threshold
of wealth below which the overall contribution of ﬁnancial development to growth is negative;
(ii) the level of wealth at which this contribution starts to decrease, that is, the level at which
the marginal eﬀect becomes negative; and (iii) whether there is a within-sample large level of
wealth above which further ﬁnancial development is detrimental for growth.
Even if the use of ﬁve-year averages reduces the potential eﬀects of unaccounted short-term
ﬂuctuations, the lasting recessions associated with ﬁnancial crises may still contaminate the
8The groups are classiﬁed according to their GNI per capita: low income, $735 or less; lower-middle income,
$736 - $2,935; upper-middle income, $2,936 - $9,075; and high income, which are those countries that belong
to the OECD and have a GNI greater than $9,076; this excludes Mexico and Turkey from the OECD mem-
bers. With this classiﬁcation, 29 percent of the countries included in the sample are classiﬁed as low-income
economies, 29 percent as lower-middle, 14 percent as upper-middle, and 28 percent as high income.
9There is an important drawback with these two classiﬁcations: they cannot account for changes over time
across income groups. The estimation procedure uses ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory variables, which does
not allow for variations among income groups.
6ﬁnance-growth relationship. Accounting for the eﬀect of banking crises in a low frequency
data set presents some conceptual complications. The ﬁrst complication is that frequently
banking crises are preceded by lending booms with high growth and, after the usual recession
associated with the crisis, economic growth can be lower than average. In addition, the
duration of crises diﬀer for each episode. Within a ﬁve year period several combinations are
p o s s i b l e .W ec h o o s et oa c c o u n tf o rt h ee ﬀects of banking crises on economic growth only for
the duration of the crises as reported in Caprio and Klingebiel (1999, 2003). For this purpose
we construct a frequency-of-crises dummy variable that takes the value of the proportion of
the ﬁve-year period with banking crisis. For example, for the 1976-1985 Israeli banking crises,
the dummy variable will take the value of 0.8 in the period 1976-1980, and 0.6 for the period
1981-1985. This dummy variable is then included to control for the growth losses generated
by the crises.10
Methodology
The estimation of equation (1) poses some challenges. The ﬁrst is the presence of time
and country speciﬁce ﬀects. Time eﬀects can be accounted for by including period-speciﬁc
dummies; however, the common methods to account for individual eﬀects (within or diﬀer-
ence estimators) are not valid since the resulting error term is correlated with initial income.
The second problem is the likely joint endogeneity of most explanatory variables and eco-
nomic growth. Simultaneous or reverse causation can generate biases in the estimates of the
contribution of ﬁnancial development to growth. In the following paragraphs we outline the
econometric methodology used to control for unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects and joint
endogeneity in a dynamic model of panel data.
We use the Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic
models of panel data, introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and
Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). Taking advantage of the panel nature of the
data, these estimators are based on: (i) diﬀerencing regressors and/or instruments to control
for unobserved eﬀects, and; (ii) using lagged observations of the explanatory variables in levels
as instruments (called “internal” instruments). After accounting for the time-speciﬁce ﬀects
and grouping all explanatory variables in a vector X,e q u a t i o n(1) can be rewritten as:
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + β0Xi,t + ηi + εi,t. (3)
In order to eliminate the country-speciﬁce ﬀect, we take ﬁrst-diﬀerences of equation (3):
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)+β0(Xi,t − Xi,t−1)+εi,t − εi,t−1. (4)
10It is also possible to hypothesize that further ﬁnancial expansion in a context of ﬁnancial vulnerability can
be detrimental to economic growth, and include an interactive crises-ﬁnancial development dummy. However
this variable is consistently non signiﬁcant.
7The use of instruments must deal with the two challenges of the estimation: (i) the likely
endogeneity of the explanatory variables, and (ii) the problem that, by construction, the new
error term, εi,t − εi,t−1, is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, yi,t−1 − yi,t−2.T h e
instruments consist of previous observations of the explanatory and lagged dependent vari-
ables. Given that the estimation uses past values of the regressors, the estimation procedure
is valid only under the assumption of weak exogeneity of explanatory variables; this is, they
can be correlated with current and past realizations of the growth rate, but they are assumed
to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term.11
Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, εi,t, is not serially correlated, and (b) the
explanatory variables X are weakly exogenous, the GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the
following moment conditions:
E[yi,t−s · (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2,t=3 ,...,T, (5)
E[Xi,t−s · (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2,t=3 ,...,T. (6)
The GMM estimator based on these conditions is known as the diﬀerence estimator. Al-
though this estimator has clear advantages over the classic diﬀerence estimator for panel data,
it also has some statistical shortcomings. As shown by Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, the
use of lagged levels of these variables make weak instruments for the equations in diﬀerences.12
In small samples, Monte Carlo experiments show that this weakness can produce biased co-
eﬃcients. In addition, it inﬂuences the consistency of the estimator, because asymptotically
t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ec o e ﬃcient estimates rises.
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997) propose an estimator that re-
duces potential biases and imprecisions associated with the diﬀerence estimator. This new
estimator combines in a system the regression in diﬀerences with the regression in levels. The
instruments for the regression in diﬀerences are the same as above. The instruments for the
regression in levels are the lagged diﬀerences of the corresponding variables. These lagged
diﬀerences are valid instruments under the additional assumption of no correlation between
the change in the explanatory variables and the country-speciﬁce ﬀect (which does not rule
out the possibility of correlation between the level of these variables and the country-speciﬁc
eﬀect ). This assumption results from the following mean stationarity property:
E(yi,t+q · ηi)=E(yi,t+p · ηi) and E(Xi,t+q · ηi)=E(Xi,t+p · ηi) for all p and q. (7)
11As Levine et al. (2000) mention, the assumption of weak exogeneity does not imply that expectations of
future growth do not have an eﬀect on current ﬁnancial development, but only that unanticipated future shocks
to economic growth do not inﬂuence ﬁnancial development.
12Persistence in banking balances make this shortcoming particularly important for the ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation variables.
8The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the regression in
levels) are:13
E[(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) · (ηi + εi,t)] = 0, (8)
E[(Xi,t−1 − Xi,t−2) · (ηi + εi,t)] = 0. (9)
Using the moment conditions given by equations (5), (6),(8) and (9), we employ a Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure to generate consistent estimates of the para-
meters of interest and their asymptotic variance-covariance matrix (Arellano and Bond 1991,
and Arellano and Bover 1995). The equations for the system estimator are:
ˆ θ =
³
¯ X´ Zˆ Ω−1Z´¯ X
´−1
¯ X´ Zˆ Ω−1Z´¯ y, (10)
where θ is the vector of coeﬃcients (α,β), ¯ y is a vector of growth stacked ﬁrst in diﬀerences
a n dt h e ni nl e v e l s , ¯ X is a matrix of explanatory variables (including the lagged dependent
variable, that is, [yt−1,X])s t a c k e dﬁrst in diﬀerences and then in levels, Z is the matrix
of instruments derived from the moment conditions, and ˆ Ω is a consistent estimate of the
variance-covariance matrix.14
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the ex-
planatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. We address this issue by
considering two speciﬁcation tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and
Bover (1995). The ﬁrst is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall
validity of the instruments. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model.
The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated.
As with the Sargan test, the model speciﬁcation is supported when the null hypothesis is not
rejected. In the system speciﬁcation we test whether the diﬀerenced error term (that is, the
residual of the regression in diﬀerences) is second-order serially correlated.15 Second-order
13Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the diﬀerences speciﬁcation, only the most recent
diﬀerence is used as instrument in the levels speciﬁcation. Using other lagged diﬀerences would result in
redundant moment conditions. (see Arellano and Bover 1995).
14Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following two-step estimation procedure to improve the consistency
and eﬃciency of the GMM estimates. The ﬁrst step: assuming that the residuals εi,t, are independent and ho-
moskedastic both across countries and over time, it is possible to obtain consistent estimators of the coeﬃcients
using an speciﬁc weighting matrix to determine the variance covariance matrix ˆ Ω
−1. The residuals obtained
from the consistent estimated coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst step are used to provide a new consistent estimate of the
variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. This matrix is then used to re-estimate the parameters
of interest (i.e. second-step estimates). Asymptotically, the second-step estimates are superior to the ﬁrst-step
ones insofar as eﬃciency is concerned.
15By construction, ﬁrst-order serial correlation of the diﬀerenced error term is expected even if the original
error term εi,t is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.
9serial correlation of the diﬀerenced residual would indicate that the original error term εi,t
is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order one. This would
reject the appropriateness of the proposed instruments (and would call for higher-order lags
to be used as instruments).
2.2 Estimation Results, Wealth Eﬀects.
For comparison purposes, we ﬁrst estimate the model without allowing for wealth eﬀects in
the ﬁnancial development growth relationship. The results of this estimation are summarized
in Table 4 in Appendix B. The coeﬃcients of the control variables, with the exception of
inﬂation, are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. As in previous studies, the results show
that ﬁnancial depth has positive and signiﬁcant growth eﬀects. Moreover, when we control for
the output loss generated by banking crises, there is an important increase in the contribution
of ﬁnancial intermediation to income per capita growth.
Table 5 presents the estimation results with wealth eﬀects using the World Bank classiﬁ-
cation of countries. Financial development exerts a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth
for all income groups; the exception is when ﬁnancial development is proxied using liquid
liabilities, in the low-income group of countries this contribution is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Moreover, for both indicators of ﬁnancial depth, there is evidence that low-income countries
have a smaller beneﬁto ff u r t h e rﬁnancial development than middle-income and high-income
countries; when we control for banking crises, this beneﬁt in low income countries is around
at h i r do ft h ee ﬀect in the other income groups. In addition, Table 5 contains the results
of hypothesis tests of whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences or not in the growth eﬀects
of ﬁnancial intermediation for the other income groups. When credit to the private sector is
used, we cannot reject that for middle-income and high-income groups the eﬀect is the same.
However, when we use liquid liabilities, high-income OECD economies enjoy a signiﬁcantly
higher growth gain from ﬁnancial intermediation than middle-income countries.
Although the previous estimation provides some evidence of wealth eﬀects in the ﬁnance-
growth relationship, the income thresholds deﬁn e db yt h eW o r l dB a n kc l a s s i ﬁcation are not
necessarily the appropriate ones for this relationship. We group countries into deciles accord-
ing to their average initial income. Table 6 reports the growth regression results using this
classiﬁcation. These results depict a clearer picture of the existence of wealth eﬀects in the
contribution of ﬁnancial development to economic growth: (i) for the two lowest deciles of
income per capita, this contribution is negative; (ii) this contribution appears to be increasing
in the level of income (except for a drop in the middle of the distribution). Figures 1 and 2
in Appendix B summarize the coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial development in the growth equation,
along with their 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
10The results of the decile classiﬁcation suggest that we can approximate the eﬀect of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation on growth by a linear quadratic interaction between ﬁnancial development
and the initial level of income per capita . Table 7 presents the results of these estimations.
The parameters of ﬁnancial development are highly signiﬁcant for both indicators of ﬁnancial
depth, and their signs suggest the existence of three thresholds of income per capita: (i) a low
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. Table 7 also reports these three thresholds for both proxies of ﬁnancial develop-
ment. The low income threshold y1
o for private credit is $131.2;16 4 countries have observations
below this threshold, for a total of 10 observations (represent only 1.5% of the sample). For
liquid liabilities the threshold y1
o is $167.7; there are 7 countries with a total of 22 observations
(3.3% of the sample). The second thresholds y2
o are $3,835.6 for private credit and $4,711.5 for
liquid liabilities. In the region deﬁned between the ﬁrst and the second threshold there are 61
countries and 428 observations (64.5% of the sample) for private credit, and 61 countries and
441 observations (66.4% of the sample) for liquid liabilities. The third thresholds y3
o are well
above the maximum level of income per capita in the sample ($112,155.1 and $132,382.9 for
private credit and liquid liabilities, respectively, while the maximum observation is $45,952 ).
Thus, there cannot be any inference from the third threshold y3
o.
In all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations used, the Sargan tests and the second-order correlation
tests indicate that we cannot reject the validity of the moment conditions assumed for the
estimation.
In the rest of the paper we develop a model of ﬁnancial intermediation to oﬀer an expla-
nation of the wealth eﬀects observed in the estimation.
3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The economy consists of an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping generations. In each period, a
generation, composed by a continuum of ex-ante identical agents with unit mass, is born;
there is no population growth.
Agents live for two periods. They have an endowment of one unit of labor during the ﬁrst
period of their lives, which they supply inelastically. Agents do not value consumption when
they are young. During the second period of their life they are subject to a time preference
shock. With probability π, an agent only values consumption when middle aged (the beginning
of her second period), and becomes an early consumer. With probability (1 − π), she only
16All ﬁgures are measured in purchasing power parity at 1995 international dollars.
11values consumption when old (the end of her second period) and becomes a late consumer.
The shock is stochastically independent across agents, and is private information to the agent.




































L ≥ 0, are the levels of early and late consumption at t +1of an agent born at t.
There is one good, used for consumption and investment. There are two technologies
available. First, there is a storage technology that uses the good as the only input and, for
each unit invested at t, gives a return of one unit in any sub-period of t +1 .T h e r e i s a l s o
a long-term technology with a Cobb-Douglas production function, which uses labor l and
capital k as inputs. Capital fully depreciates after being used in production. If the technology
is left until full maturity (the end of the period), it gives the return: z(k,l)=Akβl1−β.S i n c e
the unit of labor is supplied inelastically, the capital intensive production function can be
expressed as:
f(k) ≡ z(k,1) = Akβ (13)
This production can be prematurely liquidated, with a liquidation cost. In this case, the
product generated is a fraction γ, 0 <γ<1, of the full return at maturity, γf(k). Hence,
this liquidation cost is expressed in terms of output and not in terms of capital as γf(k).17
Factor markets are competitive, and each input is paid its realized marginal product.
However, the realized marginal product depends on the ﬁnancial arrangements in the economy
because it depends on the proportion of long-term projects liquidated.
Wages received at the end of period t represent the unique source of wealth for members of
the generation. After receiving wages, agents make their investment decisions before observing
the realization of their liquidity shock.18 There is an initial generation endowed with w0 > 0
units of the consumption good.
17This assumption makes the relative marginal returns of a long project left until maturity and one liquidated
prematurely a constant (
f 0(k)
γf 0 (k) ≡
1
γ).
18We abstract from the consumption-saving decision to stress the choice among assets with diﬀerent liquid-
ity. Agents do not value consumption when young, the consumption-saving decision at t is trivial, and they
will invest their full wealth either directly in the two technologies (autarky), or as bank deposits (ﬁnancial
intermediation).
124F i n a n c i a l A u t a r k y
In this section we ﬁnd the benchmark solution of ﬁnancial autarky. This benchmark will be
used to analyze the growth and welfare costs and beneﬁts of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Under ﬁnancial autarky, young agents make their investment decision between storing
goods and investing in capital on their own. We assume that each worker supplies her unit of
labor to a continuum of representative ﬁrms with mass m ∈ (0,1].19. Under this assumption,
young workers are paid a wage equal to the expected marginal product of labor wt+1 =
(1 − β)[πγ +1− π]f(kt) and, at the same time, the investors (old agents) receive the marginal
product of their investment-liquidation decision (γβf(k) if early consumer and βf(k) if late).
4.1 The Optimal Individual Investment Decision
We start by analyzing the investment problem of a representative member of an arbitrary
generation, and ﬁnd her optimal portfolio decision as a function of her level of wealth (w).
Deﬁne the return of holding the long asset as the function h(k) ≡ βf(k). The marginal
return of the long investment is h 0(k) if the investment is maintained until full maturity, and
γh0(k) if it is liquidated prematurely. Let’s deﬁne the two following capital levels:
k such that γh0(k)=1
k such that h 0(k)=1
Since labor is inelastically supplied, the long-term asset presents diminishing returns to
capital. For low levels of capital (k<k ), the marginal return of the long-term asset, even
when it is prematurely liquidated, exceeds the marginal return of the storage technology
(γh0(k) ≥ 1). Beyond some level of investment in the long asset (k>k), its marginal return
is lower than one (h 0(k) ≤ 1).
Under ﬁnancial autarky, investment in capital is risky because its return depends on the
realization of the liquidity shock. At the end of their ﬁrst period, for any given level of wealth
w>0, a typical agent of generation t chooses investment in the long technology k to maximize:
πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL) (14)
subject to 0 ≤ k ≤ w (15)
where cE = w − k + γh(k),c L = w − k + h(k),a n dt h ed i ﬀerence between wealth and capital
(w − k) is investment in the storage technology.
19This mass m can be arbitrarily close to zero; however, this is equivalent to assuming that every worker works
for all ﬁrms. This assumption is not essential for the results of the paper, and it helps to avoid heterogeneity
in the size of ﬁrms, something which would unnecessarily complicate the dynamics of the model.
13The following proposition characterizes the optimal solution for members of any given
generation under ﬁnancial autarky:
Proposition 4.1 For every level of wealth w, t h eu n i q u es o l u t i o n( kopt(w),c E(w),c L(w))t o
the agent’s problem under autarky is characterized by the following conditions:


















0 <k opt(w) <w
cE = w − kopt + γh(kopt)
cL = w − kopt + h(kopt)
(interior solution)





Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is the following: the expected marginal beneﬁt of investing in
capital is (1 − π)u 0(cL)(h 0 (k) − 1), while the expected marginal cost is πu0(cE)(1− γh0 (k)).
For low levels of wealth it is possible that γh0(w) > 1, making a corner solution with full
investment in capital optimal. The threshold w∗ is deﬁned as the level of wealth at which
full investment in capital equates marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost. This threshold deﬁnes
two regions of the optimal portfolio under ﬁnancial autarky. When wealth is lower than w∗,
agents invest their full wealth in capital; above this threshold they invest in both assets.20
The optimal capital choice kopt(w) is strictly increasing and concave in w. The proportion of
wealth invested in the long asset,
kopt(w)
w , is constant for w ≤ w∗, and it is strictly decreasing
in w for w>w ∗.21
Investment under autarky is ineﬃcient. The ﬁrst ineﬃciency arises because in poor
economies, self-insured agents invest, as precautionary savings, their full wealth in capital
beyond the point where it is eﬃcient to do so. When the marginal return of the short asset
exceeds the marginal liquidation value of the long asset, (γh0(w) < 1), it would be eﬃcient to
start investing in the short asset. However, w∗ >kmeans that for levels of wealth between k
and w∗ agents are over-investing in the long asset (k = w). The second ineﬃciency occurs for
levels of wealth greater than w∗. Early consumers are forced to liquidate productive invest-
ments to cover their liquidity needs, while late consumers ﬁnance some of their consumption
20The threshold level of wealth w





21See appendix A for the derivation of the properties of the optimal capital choice function
14using the less productive liquid investment. The impossibility of receiving insurance through
ﬁnancial markets generates an ineﬃcient liquidation of the long investment.22 This liquidation
implies that capital is bounded above by kmax (h0(kmax)= 1
πγ+(1−π) > 1) ,w h i l ei ti se ﬃcient




For low levels of wealth, when agents are investing only in the long technology, liquidity self
insurance is constant (cE
cL = γ). For higher levels of wealth, when agents are investing in both
assets (w>w ∗), an increase in wealth reduces the gap between early and late consumption.
Nevertheless, full liquidity risk insurance is not possible under ﬁnancial autarky.
4.2 The Dynamics of Wealth, Capital and Consumption Under Autarky
In this part, we characterize the steady state of the economy and study the evolution of wealth,
capital and consumption towards this stationary equilibrium. Since capital fully depreciates
after it is used, the connection between the individual problem and the dynamics of the
intertemporal model is given by wages of the next generation.
At t =1an initial old generation exists, endowed with w0 > 0, and we assume that this
wealth has already been invested according with the optimal conditions stated above. The
timing convention is that a generation born at t makes its optimal choice of capital kt+1,
therefore:
wt = Fa(wt−1)=( 1− β)(πγ +1− π)f(k(wt−1)) (16)
kt = k(wt−1)=kopt(wt−1)
Since f (·),k(·) are continuous, increasing and concave, and kopt(0) = 0 and lim
w→∞kopt(w)=
kmax, Fa(w) is a continuous, increasing and concave function. Moreover, Fa(w)=w admits a
unique stable non-zero root. For any positive initial wealth w0 > 0, this implies the following
dynamics:
Proposition 4.2 Convergence and the steady state under ﬁnancial autarky.








(ii) The steady state has investment in both assets (
_
w





22This is the ineﬃciency of autarky that in DD motivates a role for banks as eﬃcient liquidity providers.
23A risk neutral consumer will invest in a risky asset up to the point where the actuarial marginal return of
the risky asset equates the marginal return of the safe asset; a risk averse consumer will invest always strictly
less than this level and lim
w→∞kopt(w)=kmax
24The position of the steady state between the two regions, deﬁned by w
∗, gives a qualitative characterization
of the steady state but does not determine its level, because the threshold w
∗ is a function of the parameters.
15Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 4 in Appendix C presents the dynamics of wealth.25 It shows how the economy
converges to its stationary equilibrium
_
w
a. Beyond the threshold w∗, the rate of growth
decreases rapidly, overinvestment in the previous region has already exhausted the marginal
returns on capital, and the constant level of liquidation π becomes more and more costly
in terms of growth. Finally, as both consumptions (cE,c L) are monotonically increasing in
wealth, their dynamics follow the dynamics of wealth.
5 Intra-generational Risk-Sharing and Financial Intermediaries.
Uncertainty in this economy pertains to the liquidity needs of individuals and is idiosyncratic.
Therefore, welfare gains are possible via a mechanism of liquidity preference insurance. Dia-
mond and Dybvig (1983) show that, in the absence of banking crises, the ﬁrst-best solution
can be implemented through a competitive banking system with standard deposit contracts.
Nevertheless, if banks oﬀer the ﬁrst-best contract, the ﬁrst-best equilibrium is one of two
possible equilibria. In the second equilibrium there is a coordination of beliefs that banks will
not be able to service all the deposits at the late sub-period, driving a total run on the bank
at the beginning of t +1 . In this paper we abstract from these bank-run equilibrium, and
assume that banks can oﬀer optimal risk sharing.26
5.1 Generation t Optimal Risk-Sharing
In this model, a ﬁnancial intermediary is a mutual, in which members of the same generation
pool their resources. After having worked in the ﬁrst period, agents deposit their full wealth
w in the bank. On the aggregate, all uncertainty disappears: b yt h el a wo fl a r g en u m b e r s ,t h e
bank knows that a proportion π of agents will demand their deposits in the early sub-period,
and a proportion (1−π) in the late sub-period. Therefore, the bank can select the investment
portfolio (k), the optimal proportion of the long asset that it will liquidate prematurely (λ),
as well as the ﬁxed payoﬀs for early and late consumers to form the most eﬃcient match
between liquidity needs of agents and the highest returns of the assets. In addition, the bank
centralizes production and pays a wage to the following generation (w0) equal to the realized
marginal product of labor w0 =( 1− β)(λγ +1− λ)f(k).
At any period t, and for any given level of deposits (wealth w>0), a representative bank
chooses k, λ, cE and cL to maximize expected utility of a representative current depositor:
25The parameters used in the simulation are presented in Appendix C.
26This contract is equivalent to the Diamond and Dybvig solution, or unconstrained optimal risk sharing in
which either types are observable or the probability of the sunspot equilibrium is zero. In Gaytan and Ranciere
(2005) we explore the consequences of having bank runs with positive probability.
16πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL) subject to (17)
0 ≤ k ≤ w (18)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (19)
πcE ≤ w − k + λγh(k) (20)
πcE +( 1− π)cL ≤ (1 − λ)h(k)+ w − k + λγh(k) (21)
cE ≤ cL (22)
Equation (20) is the resource constraint at the early sub-period of t +1 ; for serving agents
with early liquidity needs, the bank can liquidate the short asset (w − k) and a proportion λ
of the long-term technology. Equation (21) is the resource constraint at the late sub-period of
t+1; the bank uses all its remaining assets to service late consumers. Agents still have access
to the storage technology; therefore, the bank must oﬀer a higher return to patient consumers
so that they do not withdraw their funds at the early stage and store it up to the late stage.
This is reﬂected in the incentive compatibility constraint (22).
The bank provides the optimal level of liquidity (given by the liquidation policy of the
long asset (λ) and investment in the short technology (w − k)) and by the provision of opti-
mal liquidity insurance (cE
cL) . L i q u i d i t yp r o v i s i o nc a nb em e a s u r e db yt h es h a r eo fl i q u i d i t y
requirements of early consumers covered using the short asset (w−k
πcE ).
The complete characterization of the optimal solution of the problem is stated in the
following proposition (see Appendix A for proofs and details).
Proposition 5.1 For each level of wealth, the unique solution (kopt(w),λ opt(w),c E(w),c L(w))
to the optimal risk sharing problem is characterized by the following conditions:


















C e w ≤ w ≤ ˆ w
u0(cE)
u0(cL) = h0(k)
1 <h 0(k) < 1
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D w ≥ ˆ w
u0(cE)
u0(cL) =1 k λ =0 w − k + h(k) =cE
17where k and k were deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n3 . 1 ;e w, ˆ w, λ∗ and λopt(w) are deﬁned by:
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The optimal portfolio and liquidation policy deﬁne four regions (A to D) delimited by the
income thresholds k , ˜ w and ˆ w:
Region A: No investment in short-term technology, no liquidity provision and
constant level of liquidity insurance.
Region A is deﬁned as the range of wealth (w ≤ k) for which investing in capital dominates
investment in the short asset. The optimal portfolio is the same as under autarky, and all
wealth is invested in the long-term asset. In this case, the bank is not providing extra liquidity,
but only acting as a liquidity insurance provider. The bank is liquidating prematurely a ﬁxed
proportion of the long technology λ∗. Optimal liquidation increases with the degree of risk
aversion, which reﬂect agents’ preference for liquidity insurance. For suﬃciently high risk
aversion (σ>1), optimal liquidation is higher than aggregate liquidation under autarky π.
In that case, higher liquidity insurance imposes the cost of lower output and rate of growth
than under autarky.
Region B: Constant level of long-term investment, reduction of early liquida-
tion, increasing liquidity provision and constant level of liquidity insurance
For k≤ w ≤ e w the ﬁnancial intermediary invests in both assets and provides extra liquidity.
Investment in capital is kept ﬁxed at k, the bank keeps the marginal return of the long asset
ﬁxed at a high level, so that its marginal return, when liquidated prematurely, equals the
marginal return of storing the good.27 Even if the capital stock is ﬁxed, output can grow
because the bank is liquidating a decreasing proportion of the long asset. This eﬀect would be
reﬂected as an increase in total factor productivity. The bank starts using the liquid asset as
a source of liquidity to pay out early consumers, reducing premature liquidation of the long
asset. Late consumers are served using an increasing proportion of the fully-matured output.
However, since the bank is still using premature liquidation to serve early agents, liquidity
insurance is kept ﬁx e da tt h es a m el e v e la si nr e g i o nA .
27Two assets can be used to serve the same type of consumption only if their marginal returns are the same
at the required moment of liquidation.
18Region C: No liquidation of long term investment, increasing investment in
both assets, constant provision of liquidity and increasing level of liquidity insur-
ance.
When wealth has crossed certain threshold (w ≥ e w), the ﬁnancial intermediary stops using
the long asset to serve early consumers. All the long technology is left until full maturity
(λ =0 ) to serve late consumers, and investment in capital can increase again. Increasing
investment in capital over this region implies that the marginal return of the asset used to
serve late consumers decreases relative to the marginal return of the asset used for early
consumption, making optimal to increase liquidity insurance (
u0(cE)
u0(cL) = h0(k) implies that cE
cL
is increasing in w).28
Region D: Full insurance, provision of liquidity for late consumers.
For high levels of wealth (w>ˆ w), investment in the long asset is kept ﬁxed at the level
(k) at which the marginal return of both assets is equalized (h0(k)=1 ), and it is optimal for
the bank to provide full insurance by oﬀering the same level of consumption for early and late
withdrawers.29 Early consumption is always served using the storage technology, yet, when
wealth is strictly greater than the threshold ˆ w, late consumption is served using both assets
and implies a transfer of the liquid asset to the late subperiod.
The regions of the optimal risk sharing solution imply that liquidity and liquidity insurance
provided by the bank are endogenous, and they increase with the level of deposits (wealth)
received in each period. A larger economy will have higher liquidity, less ineﬃcient liquidation,
and better insurance among diﬀerent liquidity needs. In the following section we analyze the
dynamics of this economy.
5.2 The Dynamics of Wealth, Capital and Consumption
Financial intermediaries can implement welfare-improving allocations for consumers of any
given generation. In this section we analyze the dynamic implications of this ﬁnancial arrange-
ment. We show that the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium (
_
w
b)a n da n a l y z et h e
dynamics of wealth, capital and consumption.
At any period, wages wt, capital kt and optimal liquidation λt are deﬁned by the following
28The faster the increase in capital, the faster is the improvement in liquidity insurance.
29Perfect insurance is possible because there are decreasing returns to capital. When the returns to capital
are constant, the provision of perfect insurance require some form of intergenerational transfer, see Fulgueri
and Rovelli (1998).
19relations:
wt = Fb(wt−1)=( 1− β)(λ(wt−1)γ +1− λ(wt−1))f(k(wt−1)) (27)
kt = kopt(wt−1)
λt = λopt(wt−1)
The properties of Fb(wt−1) (see Appendix A) imply the following properties of the dy-
namics of wealth.
Proposition 5.2 Convergence and the steady state under ﬁnancial intermediation.
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(ii) For any positive level of initial wealth w0 > 0,w 0 6=
_
w
b, the economy converges monoton-











b > ˆ w the economy converges to the steady state in ﬁnite time.
Proof. See Appendix A
The dynamics of early and late consumption under ﬁnancial intermediation follow the
dynamics of wealth. When wealth is increasing (decreasing) over time, both types of con-
sumption are increasing (decreasing). In regions A,B, and D, keeping liquidity insurance
constant implies that both early and late consumptions must be growing at the same rate. By






σ.T h u s ,i f
wealth is growing over region C, the rate of growth of early consumption must be greater than
the rate of growth of late consumption. Positive growth over this region implies improving
insurance.
6 The Consequences of Financial Intermediation.
In this section, we analyze the implications of the presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries by
comparing the consequences of the autarkic and banking solutions for welfare and economic
growth (the variables of these solutions are indexed by {a,b}, respectively).
The fundamental source of ineﬃciency under ﬁnancial autarky is the absence of a mecha-
nism for pooling liquidity risk, making necessary that each agent insures herself against such
risk. Since the bank can implement optimal risk sharing among current depositors, for a given
30The position of the steady state among the diﬀerent regions, as in autarky, does not determine its level.
20level of wealth, welfare for the current generation is necessarily higher than under ﬁnancial
autarky.
Under banking, liquidation of the long technology is optimally chosen and it allows to
distribute a fraction of the high returns of this asset to early consumers. Once the economy
has attained certain level of wealth, it gradually reduces this liquidation to zero. Conversely,
under autarky aggregate liquidation of the long term technology remains a constant fraction π.
Since the marginal products of capital and labor depend inversely on the level of liquidation,
its suppression is central to explain why ﬁnancial intermediaries can attain a higher steady
state level of wealth.
The following proposition compares the optimal capital choice under ﬁnancial autarky and
ﬁnancial intermediation.
Proposition 6.1 A unique wealth level m ∈ (max{w∗, e w}, b w) exists, such that the optimal
capital choice under ﬁnancial intermediation and the optimal choice under autarky are equal
for w = m. For k <w<m , the capital choice is higher under autarky that under ﬁnancial
intermediation (overinvestment).F o r w>m , the capital choice is lower under autarky
that under ﬁnancial intermediation (underinvestment)
Proof. see Appendix A
Figure 3 compares the optimal capital choice and liquidation policy of both regimes for
each level of wealth. In autarky, over-investment for low levels of wealth is a direct conse-
quence of precautionary saving behavior of agents that face idiosyncratic liquidity risk. At
low levels of wealth w ∈ (k,w∗), agents overinvest in the long asset when it would be eﬃcient
to start investing a fraction of wealth in the short asset and reduce liquidation. In region
B, w ∈ (k, e w), the marginal return of capital under ﬁnancial autarky decreases, whereas,
under ﬁnancial intermediation it increases because capital is kept ﬁxed and liquidation is re-
duced. Consequently, investment under ﬁnancial intermediation increases faster in Region C
(w ∈ [k,w∗]). Even when both economies invest the same level of capital (w = m), growth and
the marginal returns of factors are higher for ﬁnancial intermediation since there is no costly
liquidation. After this point, aggregate underinvestment in capital is a direct consequence of
the low marginal return to capital due to ineﬃcient liquidation.31
We now compare the dynamics of wealth under ﬁnancial autarky and ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation. We focus on the dynamics of wealth rather than on the dynamics of capital, because
31Notice that our analysis of the ineﬃciency of ﬁnancial autarky echoes the literature on precautionary
savings in presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risks and liquidity constraints (Aiyagari (1994), Jappelli and
Pagano (1994), Calvet-Angeletos (2001)).
21wealth reﬂects both the optimal capital choice and the optimal liquidation policy of the previ-
ous generation. For any level of wealth w, it is possible to decompose the growth consequences
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The expression above can be written in terms of growth rates as:







Liquidation Eﬀect (A) Investment Eﬀect (B)
The relative growth performance depends on the combination of a liquidation eﬀect (A),
which reﬂects the diﬀerent level of liquidation (λ(w) vs. π), and an investment eﬀect (B),
which reﬂects the diﬀerence in capital choice. In terms of growth accounting, the ﬁrst eﬀect
expresses a “total factor productivity” gap and the second eﬀect an investment gap. On the
one hand, autarkic agents are overinvesting in capital on (k,m); nevertheless, this investment
eﬀect vanishes gradually and it changes sign afterwards (see Fig 4a). On the other hand,
the liquidation eﬀect will eventually favor the economy with ﬁnancial intermediaries as they
reduce liquidation to zero (at e w). The strength and timing of these eﬀects will crucially
depend on the level of risk aversion of agents.
For w ≤ k, investment is identical in both regimes, and any diﬀerence in growth must
come from diﬀerences in liquidation. For high risk aversion (σ>1), ﬁnancial intermediaries
provide high liquidity insurance through higher liquidation than autarky (λ∗ >π ), and as a
consequence the economy exhibits lower growth. By contrast, when agents are less risk averse
(σ<1), the liquidation level is lower under ﬁnancial intermediation (λ∗ <π ), allowing a
higher growth rate than under autarky.
For k <w<m ,there is a suﬃc i e n t l yl o wl e v e lo fr i s ka v e r s i o n( σ<σ< 1)b e l o ww h i c h
lower liquidation by banks completely oﬀsets the eﬀect of autarkic precautionary savings, and
the economy with ﬁnancial intermediaries grows faster. For higher risk aversion, there will
always be a range of wealth for which overinvestment in the autarkic economy, as precautionary
savings, will translate into a higher growth performance.
For w ≥ m, growth under ﬁnancial intermediation is unambiguously higher, as investment
is higher and no liquidation is optimal. The comparison in growth performance is summarized
in the following proposition:
22Proposition 6.2 it exists a σ ∈ (0,1)
i) For high risk aversion (σ>1), there exists a unique level of wealth wu ∈ (k,m) such
that for w>w u (w<w u), the growth rate under ﬁnancial intermediation is higher
(lower) than the growth rate under autarky.
ii) For low risk aversion (0 <σ<σ ), the growth rate under ﬁnancial intermediation is
strictly higher than the growth rate under autarky for all wealth levels.
iii) For intermediate risk aversion (σ ≤ σ ≤ 1), the growth rate under ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion is higher than under ﬁnancial autarky for w ∈ < − [wL,w u] with [wL,w u] ⊂ [k,m)
Proof. see Appendix A
Figure 4 in Appendix C presents a comparison of the dynamics under both ﬁnancial
arrangements for a simulation of the economy (the parameters used in the simulation are
presented in Table 8). From any level of wealth wt−1, we can read the transitional dynamics












b)). This graph illustrates the growth
cost of liquidity insurance: at early stage of economic development, the economy with ﬁnancial
intermediaries has a lower rate of growth. After the economy has crossed the threshold wu,
ﬁnancial intermediation has a strictly growth enhancing eﬀect. Figure 4 also illustrates the
stage at which the development of a banking system starts to have crucial long-run eﬀects.
When the economy has enough resources to keep an increasing number of long-term projects
until full maturity, ﬁnancial intermediation has an increasing contribution to growth. This re-
sult replicates the empirical importance of ﬁnancial intermediation for the growth perspectives
of middle income or emerging economies, and can explain why they are willing to undertake
the risk of increasing ﬁnancial vulnerability by developing their ﬁnancial systems (see Gaytan
and Ranciere, 2005). For very rich economies w>b w, ﬁnancial intermediation implements full
liquidity insurance, which is obviously unattainable under ﬁnancial autarky.
The mapping between the empirical results of Section 2 and the predictions of the the-
oretical model requires some warnings. In the ﬁrst place, the model compares two extreme
regimes: ﬁnancial autarky and full ﬁnancial intermediation. In reality, every country is lo-
cated at some intermediate point between these regimes. In addition, the model concentrates
only in the liquidity functions of ﬁnancial intermediaries, while ﬁnancial intermediaries per-
form several other growth-promoting activities. Nevertheless, the model can account for the
observed wealth eﬀects in the ﬁnancial intermediation-growth relationship. Figure 5 summa-
rizes the growth contribution of ﬁnancial development in the model, by taking the diﬀerence
between growth under ﬁnancial intermediation and growth under autarky. Financial develop-
ment has a negative eﬀect on economic growth for low income economies because the optimal
23intragenerational level of liquidity conﬂicts with the output maturity of productive invest-
ments. Middle-income countries enjoy higher growth rates, higher liquidity insurance and, at
some point, higher growth than ﬁnancial autarky. However, when the economy attains com-
plete liquidity insurance, it is no longer optimal to increase investment in growth promoting
technologies, and the positive contribution of ﬁnancial intermediation declines.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The central empirical ﬁnding of the paper is that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on growth
depends in a-non linear way on the level of income of countries. This eﬀect is increasing and
varies from negative in low-income countries to positive above a certain wealth threshold; it
reaches a maximum at intermediate levels of wealth before declining for richer countries. This
result is robust to the inclusion of controls for the growth costs associated with banking crises
episodes.
We provide a theoretical explanation for this ﬁnding that relies on the growth consequences
of the liquidity risk-sharing provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries at diﬀerent level of income
in a neo-classical context. When countries are poor and returns to long-term projects high,
even when liquidated, banks perform risk-sharing among agents by increasing the share of
long-term projects. Risk-sharing implies then lower growth. This result is similar to the
growth depressing eﬀect of a reduction in precautionary saving in models with incomplete
markets (e.g. Ayagari, 1994). As countries become richer it is optimal for banks to increase
risk-sharing by using liquid investments to ﬁnance early consumption needs. In this case,
risk-sharing implies lower liquidation, higher long-term investment and higher growth. In
growth accounting terms, the reduction of liquidation corresponds to an increase in total
factor productivity that result from bank’s eﬃcient match between the liquidity needs and
preferences of agents and the timing of the highest returns of the technologies.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. and F. Zilibotti (1997), "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk,
Diversiﬁcation, and Growth", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, 709-751.
[2] Aiyagari S. (1994), "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 3, 659-684.
[3] Allen, F. and D. Gale (1998),"Optimal Financial Crises", Journal of Finance, Vol. 53,
1245-1284.
24[4] Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000), "Optimal Currency Crises", Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 53, 177-203.
[5] Alonso-Borrego C. and M. Arellano (1999), "Symmetrically Normalized Instrumental-
Variable Estimation Using Panel Data", Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Vol.
17, 36-49.
[6] Angeletos G. and L. Calvet (2001), "Incomplete Markets, Growth and the Business Cy-
cle", Discussion Paper Number 1910, Harvard University.
[7] Arellano M. and O. Bover (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation
of Error-Components Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, 29-51.
[8] Arellano M. and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Speciﬁcation for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 58, 277-297.
[9] Beck, T., R. Levine and N. Loayza (2000a), “Financial Development and the Sources of
Growth”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1-2, 261-300.
[10] Beck T., R. Levine and N. Loayza (2000b), “Financial Intermediation and Growth:
Causality and Causes”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 46, No. 1, 31-77.
[11] Bencivenga, V. and B. Smith (1991),"Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth",
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, 195-209.
[12] Benhabib, J. and M. Spiegel (2000a), "Cross Country Growth Regressions: Are Primitives
All That Matter?”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 5, 341-360.
[13] Benhabib, J. and M.Spiegel (2000b), "The Role of Financial Development in Growth and
Investment", Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 5, No. 4, 315-340.
[14] Bhattacharya, S., P. Fulghieri and R. Rovelli (1998), "Financial Intermediation versus
Stock Markets in a Dynamic Intertermporal Model", Journal of Institutional and Theo-
retical Economics, March.
[15] Bhattacharya S., A. Boot and A.Thakor (1998), "The Economics of Bank Regulation",
Journal-of-Money,-Credit,-and-Banking; Vol. 30, No. 4, pages 745-70.
[16] Blundell R, and S. Bond (1998), "Initial conditions and Moment Conditions in Dynamic
Panel Data Models", Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, 115-143.
[17] Caprio G. and D. Klingebiel (1999,2003), "Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial
Crises", mimeo World Bank.
25[18] Chang, R. and A. Velasco (2000), "Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime",
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 92, No. 1, 1-34.
[19] Cooper R. and T. Ross (1998), "Bank Runs: Liquidity Costs and Investment Distortions",
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, 27-38.
[20] De Gregorio J. and P. Guidotti (1995), “Financial Development and Economic Growth”,
World Development, Vol. 23, No. 3, 433-448.
[21] Demirguc A. and G. Degatriache (1998), "The Determinants of Banking Crises in Devel-
oping and Developed Countries", IMF Staﬀ-Papers, Vol. 45, No. 1, 81-109.
[22] Demirguc A. and G. Degatriache (2000), "Banking Sector Fragility: A Multivariate Logit
Approach", World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 287-307.
[23] Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983), "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity",
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, 401-419.
[24] Diamond, P. (1965), "National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model", American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 55, 1126-1150.
[25] Ennis, H. and T. Keister (2003), "Economic Growth, Liquidity, and Bank Runs", Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 109, 220-245.
[26] Fulghieri, P. and R. Rovelli (1998), "Capital markets, ﬁnancial intermediaries and liquid-
ity supply", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, 1157-1179.
[27] Gaytan A. and R. Ranciere (2005), "Banks Liquidity Crises and Economic Growth",
Banco de México, Documentos de Investigación 2005-03.
[28] Goldfajn I and R. Valdes (1997), "Capital Flows and the Twin Crises: The Role of
Liquidity", International Monetary Fund, Working Paper: WP/97/87.
[29] Gourinchas P. O., O. Landerretche, and R. Valdes (1999), "Lending Booms: Some Styl-
ized Facts", unpublished.
[30] Greenwood, J. and B. Jovanovic (1990), "Financial Development, Growth, and the Dis-
tribution of Income", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, 1076-1107.
[31] Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Neweyand H. Rosen (1988), "Estimating Vector Autoregressions
with Panel Data", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 6, 1371-95.
[32] Japelli T. and M. Pagano (1994), "Saving, Growth and Liquidity Constraints", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 1, 83-109.
26[33] Kaminsky G. and C. Reinhart (1999), "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and
Balance of Payments Problems", American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No.3, 473-500.
[34] King, R. and R. Levine (1993a), "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 153, No. 3, 717-38.
[35] King, R. and R. Levine (1993b), "Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth: Theory and
evidence", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 32, 513—542.
[36] Levine, R. (1997), "Financial Development and Growth: Views and Agenda", Journal of
Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 2, 688-726.
[37] Levine, R. and S. Zervos (1996), "Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth",
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10.
[38] Levine, R., N. Loayza and T. Beck (2000), "Financial Intermediation and Growth:
Causality and Causes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 46, No. 1, 31-77.
[39] Loayza, N. and R. Ranciere (2004), "Financial Development, Financial Fragility and
Growth", forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
[40] Morris, S. and H. Shin (1998), "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulﬁlling Currency
Attacks", American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, 587-97.
[41] Odedokun, M.O. (1996), "Alternative econometric approaches for analyzing the role of
the ﬁnancial sector in economic growth: Time-series evidence from LDCs", Journal of
Development Economics, Vol. 50, 119-146.
[42] Patillo, C., H. Poirson and L. Ricci. (2002), "External Debt and Growth", IMF Working
Paper 69.
[43] Postlewaite A. and X.Vives (1987), "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon", Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 3, 485-91.
[44] Qi, J. (1994), "Bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model", Review
of Financial Studies, Vol. 7, 389-417.
[45] Saint Paul, G. (1992), "Technological choice, Financial Markets, and Economic Develop-




Proof of proposition 4.1 (The autarkic solution).
Let’s deﬁne the value function : V (k,w)=πu(w − k + γh(k)) + (1 − π)u(w − k + h(k)).
The optimal program is to ﬁnd kopt that maximizes V (k,w) subject to k ≤ w (since lim
k→0
h0(k)=














We are maximizing a continuous strictly concave function over a compact set [0,w],am a x -
imum kopt exists and is unique. Deﬁne A(k,w)=
δV (k,w)
δk and µ, the Lagrange multiplier
associated with k ≤ w.




if k<w(interior solution) A(k,w)=0





δk2 < 0 and k ≤ w ⇔ A(k,w) ≥ A(w,w) (with strict inequality if k<w ).
(iii)
δA(w,w)





Hence by (i),(ii) and (iii):
(interior and corner solution): for w = w∗ : A(w∗,w∗)=0and kopt = w∗.
(corner solution): for w<w ∗ : A(w,w) > 0 and kopt = w.





(1 − π)(h0(k) − 1)
π(1 − γh0(k))
(A3)
and the threshold w∗ is deﬁned by h0 (w∗)=
(1−π)γσ+π
(1−π)γσ+πγ
Properties of the optimal capital choice function kopt(w)
For w ≤ w∗,k opt(w)=w, and the properties for w ≤ w∗ are obvious.
For w ≥ w∗,k opt is uniquely deﬁned by A(kopt,w)=0
P1: kopt(w) is continuous on [w∗,∞),d i ﬀerentiable in w on [0,w∗)∪(w∗,∞) and right and
left diﬀerentiable at w∗.A (k,w) is continuously diﬀerentiable in k and w.
P2: kopt(w) is strictly increasing in w




















⇔ cL >c E
P3: kopt(w) is concave in w and strictly concave for w ≥ w∗.
P4:
kopt(w)
w is non increasing in w, and strictly decreasing for w ≥ w∗




























(1−γh0(k))(h0(k)−1) − σ(1 − γ)h0(k)
i
D2 < 0 (A8)
At w = w∗,k
0(−)












. By construction cL >c E ⇔
u0(cE)






= kmax by (A3).hence as w →∞ , cE → cL and
u0(cE)
u0(cL) → 1 ⇔ h0(k) →
1
1−π+πγ.
Proof of proposition 4.2 (Steady state and convergence under autarky).
Deﬁne the growth rate of wealth g (wt−1)=
Fa(wt−1)
wt−1 .






wt−1 is non increasing, k(wt−1) is strictly increasing, hence f 0(k(wt−1) is strictly decreasing.
limw→∞
k(wt−1)
wt−1 =0and limw→∞ f 0(k(wt−1)) = f0(kmax), then limw→∞ 1+g(wt−1)=0 .
Using l’Hopital Rule, limw→0
f(k(wt−1))
wt−1 = limw→0f0(k(wt−1)) = ∞.













a has a unique non zero root.
Since by deﬁnition g(
_
w
a)=0and g(·) is strictly decreasing⇒∀ wt−1 <
_
w




a,g (wt−1) > 0. Then, the unique steady state is stable.
Since Fa(wt−1) is strictly increasing: w1 >w 0 =⇒ F(w1) >F(w0) ⇔ w2 >w 1 ⇔ wt >w t−1,
∀t ≥ 0 (by iteration), thus, convergence is asymptotic.
29A.2 Optimal Risk Sharing and Financial Intermediation
Remark A.1 We are maximizing a continuous function over a compact set, then a maximum
exists.
Proof. of proposition 5.1 (The optimal risk sharing solution).
The maximization problem (eqns. 17-22) can be simpliﬁed before solving: (a) kopt > 0 since
h0(0) = ∞;( b )λ<1,i fλ =1it would always be possible to increase both cE and cL by
reducing liquidation of the long technology; (c) following Allen and Gale (1998), we solve the
problem without the ICC (eqn 22), and then show that the optimal solution always satisﬁes
it. The problem becomes to choose k, λ, cL,c E to maximize πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL) s.t.:
(i) λ ≥ 0;( i i )k ≤ w (µ1); (iii) πcE ≤ w − k + λγh(k) (µ2); and (iv) πcE +( 1− π)cL ≤
(1 − λ)h(k)+w − k + λγh(k) (µ3).
First Order Conditions. Based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
u0 (cE)=µ2 + µ3 (A9)
u0(cL)=µ3 (A10)
(µ2 + µ3)γ ≤ µ3 with equality if λ>0 (A11)
(µ2 + µ3)(1− λγh0(k)) + µ1 = µ3(1 − λ)h0(k) (A12)
(C) The incentive-compatibility constraint is satisﬁed by the optimal solution:(A9) and
(A10)⇒ u0 (cE)=µ2 + u0 (cL),µ 2 ≥ 0 ⇒ cE ≤ cL
The optimal solution.
















(A15) in (A13) ⇒ λopt=λ∗≡
πγ1/σ
πγ1/σ +( 1− π)γ
(A16)
optimal liquidation in this region is constant. Notice that: λ∗ > =














30implies a constant optimal choice of capital: γh0(k)=1 ⇔ kopt = k,a n dcE =
w−k+λγh(k)
π and cL =
(1−λ)h(k)
(1−π) . Optimal liquidation policy is obtained by substituting
the two consumptions in (A13):












⇒ case B applies for w ∈ [k, ˜ w] (A19)








⇒ k ≥ k and h0 (k) ≥ 1 ⇒ k ≤
_
k






β (1 − π)
¶

















´ = h0(kopt) (A22)
Over region C the optimal capital choice is unique
³
dA(k,w)









)=0⇔ k = kopt
dA(k,w)
dk







Region D: λ =0 ,k<wand (iii) not binding:
λ =0 ,k<w ⇒
u0 (cE)
u0 (cL)
= h0 (k) (A23)
(iii) not binding ⇒ cE = cL = c ⇔ h0(k)=1⇔ kopt =
_
k (A24)





Properties of the optimal policy function kopt(w).
The properties of optimal investment in capital are trivial for regions A, B and D (w ∈
<+/[e w, ˆ w]), where kopt(w) is either equal to w, or constant and equal to k or k.T h u s ,
we focus on region C. For w ∈ [e w,w∗]:




π )=0 .A (k,w) is a continuous, decreasing diﬀerentiable function in k. Using the
IFT:
k0
opt(w) |e w≤w≤ ˆ w=
σk
σk +( w − k)(1 − β + σβ)
> 0
31PC2 kopt(w) is strictly concave in w for w ∈ [e w, ˆ w]
k00
opt(w) |e w≤w≤ ˆ w=
−σk(1 − β + σβ)
[σk +( w − k)(1 − β + σβ)]
2 < 0
Dynamics with ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Concavity of Fb (w).
The following properties of Fb(wt−1) follow directly from the properties of f(wt−1),k(wt−1)
and λ(wt−1). The function Fb(wt−1):
(i) is continuous on [0,∞).
(ii) is strictly increasing on [0, ˆ w] and constant on [ˆ w,∞)
(iii) is diﬀerentiable on [0,k) ∪ (k, e w) ∪ (e w, ˆ w) ∪ (ˆ w,∞),l e f ta n dr i g h td i ﬀerentiable at k, e w, ˆ w.
As we shown below:
Fb(wt−1) is strictly concave on [0, e w], strictly concave on [e w, ˆ w], concave on [e w,∞).F b(wt−1) is










The proof consists in analyzing concavity within the diﬀerent regions and the slopes of the
function Fb(wt−1) at the thresholds (k, e w ,ˆ w).
Region A: Fb0(wt−1)=( 1− β)(1− λ∗(1 − γ))f0(wt−1) > 0,a n d
Fb00(wt−1)=( 1− β)(1− λ∗(1 − γ))f00(wt−1) < 0. Hence, Fb (·) is strictly concave.
















(constant). Then Fb0(−)(k) >Fb0(+)(k).
Region C: Fb0(wt−1)=( 1− β)f0(wt−1)k0 (wt−1) > 0 and since k00 (wt−1) < 0
Fb00(wt−1)=( 1− β)(f00(wt−1)k0 (wt−1)+f0(wt−1)k00 (wt−1)) < 0








σk+( ˆ w−k)(1−β+βσ) >
0











γ λ∗ the set deﬁn e db yt h ec u r v eFb (wt−1) is non-convex. However, as we
show in the following proof, the steady state equilibrium is unique.
Proof of proposition 5.2 (The steady state and convergence).




β (λ∗γ +1− λ∗)f 0(w) ⇒
dgb(w)
w < 0







































< 0 ⇔ σk+(w−k) >
0 which is always satisﬁed.










Using l’ˆ Hopital rule, lim
wt−1→0
Fb(wt−1)
wt−1 =l i m
wt−1→0
Fb0(wt−1)=∞







b has a unique root.
Since by deﬁnition g(
_
w




g(wt−1) < 0 and ∀wt−1 <
_
w
b,g (wt−1) > 0. Then, the unique steady state is stable.
(iii) Asymptotic convergence and convergence in ﬁnite time.




b then gb (wt−1) >
(<)
0.
Fb (wt−1) is strictly increasing in wt−1 for 0 <w t−1 < ˆ w, hence,
Asymptotic convergence
· if w0 <
_
w
b < ˆ w then g(w0) > 0 and ∀t ≥ 1 wt >w t−1 ⇒ g(wt) > 0






b < ˆ w then g(w0) < 0 and ∀t ≥ 1 wt <w t−1 ⇒ g(wt) < 0




b > ˆ w,
_
w
b =( 1− β)f(
_
k)






b)=0<g (ˆ w) <g (w0)
by (i) and (ii), ∃ a unique t∗ < ∞, such that
(
wt∗−1 < ˆ w
wt∗ ≥ ˆ w
, hence, wt∗+1 =( 1 −β)f(k)=
_
w
b, the economy will converge to the s.s. after t∗ +1periods.
· if w0 > ˆ w ⇒ w1 =( 1− β)f(k)=
_
w
b, the economy will converge after one period.
33A.3 Consequences of Financial Intermediation
Proof of proposition 6.1 (Ineﬃcient level of investment under Financial Autarky).
Let ka(w) and kb(w) be the optimal choice function under autarky and ﬁnancial intermediation
For σ>0, {w∗, e w} ⊂]k, b w[
(i) If w ∈]k,w∗[,ka(w)=w>k b(w);i fw ∈]k, e w[,ka(w) >k b(w)=k,t h e nf o rw ∈
]k,max(w∗, e w)[,ka(w) >k b(w).
(ii)At w = b w,ka(w) <kmax <k b(w)=k; therefore since ka(w) and kb(w) are strictly
increasing strictly and concave over [max(w∗, e w), b w[, it exists a unique m ∈]max(w∗, e w), b w[
such that ka(m)=kb(m).
Proof of proposition 6.2 (Growth under Financial Autarky and Financial Intermediation).
σ>1. Exists at least one wu ∈]k,m[ such that Fa(wu)=Fb(wu)




(λ∗γ+1−λ∗) > 1 ⇐⇒ λ∗ >π⇐⇒ σ>1





w ≥ m ⇒ ka(w) ≤ kb(w) ⇒ Fa(w) <Fb(w)
f o r m( R 1 )a n d( R 2 )b yc o n t i n u i t y ,i te x i s t sat least one level of wealth wu ∈]k,m[ such that
Fa(wu)=Fb(wu)
Uniqueness of wu:
(R3) Fa(w) is strictly increasing, strictly concave over ]k,m[ and Fb(w) is strictly increasing
and aﬃne over ]k, e w]T Therefore it can be at most one root of Fa(w)=Fb(w) over ]k, e w[.I f
there is one root over ]k, e w], F0a(e w) <F0(−)b(e w).
Case (i): Fa(e w) >F b(e w). By (R3), Fa(w) >F b(w) over ]k, e w[.S i n c eFa(w) and Fb(w) are
strictly increasing and strictly concave over ]e w,m[ and Fa(m) <Fb(m), Fa(w)=Fb(w) must
have a unique root over ]e w,m[
Case (ii): Fa(e w) ≤ Fb(e w). By (R3), Fa(w)=Fb(w) as exactly one root over ]k, e w]. Let’s
show that in this case cannot be a root over ]e w,m[. Consider the unique aﬃne function G(w)
with G0(w)=e, such that G(e w)=Fb(e w) and G(m)=Fb(m).
• If F0(−)b(e w) <e⇒ F0a(e w) <F0(−)b(e w) <e . Fa is strictly concave ⇒ Fa(w) <G (w) ≤
Fb(w) over ]e w,m].
• If F0(−)b(e w) ≥ e, consider the function L(w)=Fb(w) for w ≤ e w,a n dL(w)=G(w)
for w>e w. L(w) is continuous, strictly increasing and concave over ]k,m[.T h e n
L(w)=Fa(w) has a exactly one root over ]k, e w] as Fa(e w) ≤ L(w) and no root over
]e w,m]. As Fb(w) ≥ L(w), Fb(w)=Fa(w) has exactly one root over ]k,m[.
34σ ≤ 1
(R4) Consider σ =1 .F o rw ≤ k, Fa(w)=Fb(w), and at w = k, F0(+)a(k) >F0(+)b(k).32
Then it exists a range ]k,w0) over which Fa(w) >F b(w). Thus by the same reasoning as
above, it exist a unique wu ∈]k, e w[ such that Fa(wu)=Fb(wu).I nt h i sc a s eFa(w) and Fb(w)
are intersecting continuously over [0,k),a n dt w i c eo v e r[k,m] at k and wu.
(R5) Intermediate risk aversion.B y ( R 4 ) w h e n σ → 1−, Fa(k) % Fb(k). We know that
F0(−)b(k) >F 0(+)b(k) and F0(−)a(k)=F0(−)a(k).T h e r e f o r ef o rσ suﬃciently close to one, it
exists a point wL >ksuch that Fa(wL)=Fb(wL) and F0a(wL) ≥ F0b(wL).S i n c eFa(m) <
Fb(m) by continuity (following a parallel argument to (R3)) there must exist a unique wu
such that Fa(wu)=Fb(wu) and F0a(wu) ≤ F0b(wu).
⇒Then by continuity, it exists a range (σ1,1), such that Fa and Fb are intersecting in wL
and wu ∈ ]k,m[,w L ≤ wu and wL <w ∗.
(R6) Low risk aversion.A s σ → 0: λ∗ → 0, e w → k, kb
opt (w)|w≤ b w → w, Fb (w)|w≤ b w →
(1 − β)f(w),a n dFa(w)=( 1− β)(πγ +1− π)f(kb(w)) < (1 − β)f(w)
⇒by continuity it exists a range of [0,σo] such that growth with ﬁnancial intermediation
strictly dominates growth in autarky










dσ .33⇒From (R5) ,(R6) and (R7) there exists a σ ∈ [σo,σ1] such
that:
For 0 ≤ σ<σ Fa(w) <Fb(w) ∀w>0




















dσ |w≤ b w < 0,
dF b
dσ |w≤ b w
(
=0 for w ≤ w
∗
< 0 for w>w
∗
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2       
.
ARG Argentina MH 7 JPN Japan OECD 10
AUS Australia OECD 9 KEN Kenya L 2
AUT Austria OECD 10 KOR Korea, Rep. OECD 8
BEL Belgium OECD 9 LKA Sri Lanka ML 3
BFA Burkina Faso L 1 MAR Morocco ML 4
BGD Bangladesh L 2 MDG Madagascar L 1
BOL Bolivia ML 4 MEX Mexico MH 6
BRA Brazil ML 7 MWI Malawi L 1
BWA Botswana MH 6 MYS Malaysia MH 7
CAN Canada OECD 9 NER Niger L 1
CHE Switzerland OECD 10 NGA Nigeria L 1
CHL Chile MH 7 NIC Nicaragua L 3
CHN China ML 2 NLD Netherlands OECD 10
CIV Cote d’Ivoire L 3 NOR Norway OECD 10
COG Congo, Rep. L 4 NZL New Zealand OECD 9
COL Colombia ML 6 PAK Pakistan L 3
CRI Costa Rica MH 7 PAN Panama MH 6
DEU Germany OECD 10 PER Peru ML 6
DNK Denmark OECD 10 PHL Philippines ML 4
DOM Dominican Republic ML 5 PNG Papua New Guinea L 4
DZA Algeria ML 5 PRT Portugal OECD 8
ECU Ecuador ML 5 PRY Paraguay ML 5
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. ML 4 SEN Senegal L 3
ESP Spain OECD 8 SGP Singapore MH 8
FIN Finland OECD 9 SLE Sierra Leone L 1
FRA France OECD 9 SLV El Salvador ML 5
GBR United Kingdom OECD 9 SWE Sweden OECD 10
GHA Ghana L 2 SYR Syrian Arab Republic ML 4
GMB Gambia, The L 2 TGO Togo L 2
GRC Greece OECD 8 THA Thailand ML 6
GTM Guatemala ML 4 TTO Trinidad and Tobago MH 7
HND Honduras ML 3 TUN Tunisia ML 5
HTI Haiti L 2 TUR Turkey ML 6
IDN Indonesia L 4 UGA Uganda L 1
IND India L 2 URY Uruguay MH 7
IRL Ireland OECD 8 USA United States OECD 10
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. ML 5 VEN Venezuela, RB MH 7
ISL Iceland OECD 9 ZAF South Africa ML 7
ISR Israel MH 8 ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. L 1
ITA Italy OECD 8 ZMB Zambia L 3
JAM Jamaica ML 6 ZWE Zimbabwe L 3
JOR Jordan ML 5
1/ World Bank Atlas. Classification According with GNI per capita 
2/ Deciles calculated using GDP per capita. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
36Table 3: Variables and Sources
Variable Source Definition
GDP Level and Growth
World Development Indicators, and Penn 
World data set. Real per capita GDP in 1995 US dollars.
Average years of 
schooling
Barro and Lee (1996) Average years of schooling in the population over 
25.
Government size World Development Indicators Ratio of government expenditure to GDP.
Inflation rate International Financial Statistics Log difference of Consumer Price Index.
Openness to trade World Development Indicators Sum of real exports and imports as share of real 
GDP.
Liquid Liabilities International Financial Statistics Ratio of liquid liabilities (average of year t and t-
1) to year t GDP.
Private Credit International Financial Statistics Ratio of credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to the private sector 
(average of year t and t-1) to year t GDP.
Frequency of Crises Caprio and Klingebiel  (1999, 2003) Number of years with banking crises within the 
period dived by the length of the period 5.
37Table 4: Financial Development and Growth, No Wealth Effects
Private Credit Liquid Liabilities
Regressors Coefficient p-val Coefficient p-val Coefficient p-val Coefficient p-val
Constant -1.18 0.14 -1.70 0.03 -1.96 0.00 -1.67 0.00
Initial Income per Capita -0.42 0.00 -0.47 0.00 -0.31 0.00 -0.37 0.00
Avg. secondary schooling 1.76 0.00 1.68 0.00 1.47 0.00 1.34 0.00
Government size -0.46 0.02 -0.32 0.14 -0.69 0.00 -0.93 0.00
Inflation Rate -0.08 0.17 0.07 0.52 -0.10 0.13 0.10 0.27
Trade Openness 1.31 0.00 1.15 0.00 1.22 0.00 1.35 0.00
Frequency of Crisis -2.73 0.00 -2.94 0.00
Financial Development 1.09 0.00 1.23 0.00 1.40 0.00 1.72 0.00
Dummy 71-75 -0.98 0.00 -1.18 0.00 -0.72 0.00 -1.05 0.00
Dummy 76-80 -1.97 0.00 -2.11 0.00 -1.58 0.00 -1.88 0.00
Dummy 81-85 -4.00 0.00 -3.65 0.00 -3.65 0.00 -3.46 0.00
Dummy 86-90 -3.30 0.00 -3.06 0.00 -3.03 0.00 -2.86 0.00
Dummy 91-94 -3.78 0.00 -3.31 0.00 -3.36 0.00 -3.18 0.00
Dummy 96-2000 -3.87 0.00 -3.39 0.00 -3.56 0.00 -3.36 0.00
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.25 0.36 0.33 0.32
2nd Order Serial Corr.(P-Value) 0.33 0.25 0.46 0.32
Table 5: Financial Development and Growth, World Bank Classification
Private Credit Liquid Liabilities
Regressors Coefficient p-val Coefficient p-val Coefficient p-val Coefficient p-val
Constant 1.94 0.23 4.42 0.01 8.99 0.00 11.01 0.00
Initial Income per Capita -0.70 0.00 -1.13 0.00 -1.44 0.00 -1.65 0.00
Avg. secondary schooling 1.59 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.59 0.00
Government size -0.62 0.01 -0.33 0.18 -0.84 0.00 -1.03 0.00
Inflation Rate -0.10 0.19 -0.06 0.55 -0.08 0.31 -0.07 0.39
Trade Openness 1.26 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.44 0.00 1.31 0.00
Frequency of Crisis -3.09 0.00 -3.58 0.00
Fin. Dev. Low Inc. Countries 0.65 0.00 0.58 0.01 0.24 0.44 0.34 0.34
Fin. Dev. Middle-Low Inc. Countries 1.15 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.32 0.00 1.62 0.00
Fin. Dev. Middle-High Inc. Countries 1.17 0.00 1.35 0.00 1.38 0.00 1.56 0.00
Fin. Dev. OECD Countries 1.15 0.00 1.69 0.00 1.94 0.00 2.30 0.00
Dummy 71-75 -0.86 0.00 -0.77 0.00 -0.37 0.07 -0.52 0.02
Dummy 76-80 -1.79 0.00 -1.66 0.00 -1.06 0.00 -1.05 0.00
Dummy 81-85 -3.66 0.00 -3.10 0.00 -2.78 0.00 -2.20 0.00
Dummy 86-90 -3.09 0.00 -2.48 0.00 -2.16 0.00 -1.58 0.00
Dummy 91-94 -3.57 0.00 -2.61 0.00 -2.44 0.00 -1.61 0.00
Dummy 96-2000 -3.51 0.00 -2.70 0.00 -2.35 0.00 -1.66 0.00
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.28 0.43 0.27 0.40
2nd Order Serial Corr.(P-Value) 0.36 0.31 0.56 0.39
Tests: Ho:   L =   ML 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
         Ho:   MH =   ML 0.93 0.27 0.72 0.64
         Ho:   oecd =   ML 0.98 0.48 0.00 0.00
38Table 6: Financial Development and Growth, Decile Classification
Private Credit Liquid Liabilities
Regressors Coefficient Std.Err. p-val Coefficient Std.Err. p-val Coefficient Std.Err. p-val Coefficient Std.Err. p-val
Constant 19.50 3.49 0.00 14.42 3.02 0.00 18.75 3.49 0.00 11.64 3.02 0.00
Initial Income per Capita -3.04 0.41 0.00 -2.30 0.37 0.00 -2.82 0.41 0.00 -1.82 0.37 0.00
Avg. secondary schooling 0.88 0.25 0.00 0.72 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.25 0.05 0.33 0.25 0.14
Government size -0.44 0.34 0.19 -0.33 0.35 0.35 -0.64 0.34 0.11 -0.32 0.35 0.49
Inflation Rate -0.12 0.10 0.24 -0.04 -0.03 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.42 -0.07 -0.04 0.11
Trade Openness 1.02 0.24 0.00 1.25 0.20 0.00 0.64 0.24 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00
Frequency of Crisis -2.83 0.53 0.00 -4.37 0.53 0.00
Decile 1 -1.13 0.38 0.00 -0.87 0.33 0.01 -1.02 0.38 0.00 -0.64 0.33 0.08
Decile 2 -0.28 0.43 0.50 -0.37 0.37 0.31 -0.64 0.43 0.07 -0.83 0.37 0.04
Decile 3 0.14 0.28 0.62 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.51 0.28 0.04 0.54 0.28 0.08
Decile 4 1.47 0.31 0.00 1.51 0.26 0.00 1.92 0.31 0.00 2.13 0.26 0.00
Decile 5 1.61 0.30 0.00 1.74 0.27 0.00 1.57 0.30 0.00 1.60 0.27 0.00
Decile 6 0.91 0.31 0.00 0.97 0.25 0.00 2.15 0.31 0.00 1.93 0.25 0.00
Decile 7 1.68 0.27 0.00 1.31 0.26 0.00 1.86 0.27 0.00 1.13 0.26 0.00
Decile 8 2.79 0.33 0.00 2.58 0.28 0.00 2.87 0.33 0.00 2.56 0.28 0.00
Decile 9 3.23 0.37 0.00 2.64 0.42 0.00 3.10 0.37 0.00 2.33 0.42 0.00
Decile 10 2.64 0.29 0.00 2.05 0.29 0.00 2.94 0.29 0.00 2.05 0.29 0.00
Dummy 71-75 -0.30 0.23 0.20 -0.60 0.23 0.01 -0.27 0.23 0.23 -0.50 0.23 0.05
Dummy 76-80 -0.89 0.32 0.01 -1.22 0.29 0.00 -0.89 0.32 0.00 -1.03 0.29 0.00
Dummy 81-85 -2.70 0.37 0.00 -2.81 0.30 0.00 -2.58 0.37 0.00 -2.39 0.30 0.00
Dummy 86-90 -2.19 0.28 0.00 -2.04 0.26 0.00 -2.07 0.28 0.00 -1.60 0.26 0.00
Dummy 91-94 -2.27 0.35 0.00 -2.26 0.33 0.00 -2.03 0.35 0.00 -1.67 0.33 0.00
Dummy 96-2000 -2.29 0.37 0.00 -2.03 0.34 0.00 -1.85 0.37 0.00 -1.49 0.34 0.00
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.54 0.55 0.36 0.42
2nd Order Serial Corr.(P-Value) 0.54 0.44 0.51 0.25
39Figure 1:  Contribution of Financial Development to Economic Growth. 
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Figure 2:  Contribution of Financial Development to Economic Growth. 
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40Table 7: Financial Development and Growth, Linear-Quadratic Specification
Regressors Coefficient Std.Err. p-val Coefficient Std.Err. p-val
Constant 0.97 2.91 0.74 3.71 4.34 0.39
Initial Income per Capita -0.45 0.52 0.39 -0.59 0.66 0.37
Avg. secondary schooling 1.48 0.20 0.00 1.19 0.19 0.00
Government size -0.78 0.30 0.01 -1.30 0.20 0.00
Inflation Rate -0.09 0.11 0.40 -0.09 0.10 0.35
Trade Openness 1.45 0.22 0.00 1.67 0.20 0.00
Frequency of Crisis -3.50 0.32 0.00 -3.86 0.37 0.00
Financial Development -5.54 1.92 0.00 -7.36 2.02 0.00
Financial Dev.*yo 1.61 0.41 0.00 2.06 0.39 0.00
Financial Dev.*(yo)
2 -0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.02 0.00
Dummy 71-75 -0.87 0.17 0.00 -0.64 0.16 0.00
Dummy 76-80 -1.62 0.22 0.00 -1.34 0.18 0.00
Dummy 81-85 -3.05 0.26 0.00 -2.66 0.19 0.00
Dummy 86-90 -2.45 0.21 0.00 -2.10 0.17 0.00
Dummy 91-94 -2.84 0.18 0.00 -2.51 0.18 0.00
Dummy 96-2000 -2.85 0.21 0.00 -2.58 0.23 0.00
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.44 0.50
2nd Order Serial Corr.(P-Value) 0.24 0.29







Min{yo} in sample 89.6
Max{yo} in sample 45,951.9
Private Credit Liquid Liabilities
CS i m u l a t i o n
The parameters used in the simulation are:
Table 8: Simulation Parameters
Factor Productivity A =3
Capital Share β =0 .4
Liquidation Value γ =0 .5
Probability of Liquidity Shock π =0 .4
Coeﬃcient of Risk Aversion σ =2
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Figure 3: Optimal Investment in Capital kopt(w), and Optimal Liquidation λopt(w)
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